Performance Comparison[1]

Periods Ended 6/30/25 (%)	QTR	YTD	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr	S. I.[1]
DCM Small Cap Value (gross)	2.83	-4.34	4.70	4.10	13.60	7.23	9.49
DCM Small Cap Value (net)	2.62	-4.75	3.82	3.23	12.66	6.30	8.45
Russell 2000 Value	4.97	-3.16	5.54	7.45	12.47	6.72	7.78

Periods greater than 1 year are annualized
[1]DCM inception was June 30, 2008

Performance Summary

DCM Small Cap Value ("DCM SCV") returned 2.62% (net of fees) compared with 4.97% for the benchmark, the Russell 2000 Value Index, for the quarter ending June 30, 2025.

According to Bloomberg Risk data, relative to the benchmark Russell 2000 Value Index, the portfolio's largest risk factors at quarter end are listed below. These factors are likely to have the most significant impact on relative performance, aside from individual company fundamentals:

1. Profitability (DCM SCV is higher)
2. Leverage (DCM SCV is lower)
3. Growth (DCM SCV is higher)
4. Valuation (DCM SCV is lower)
5. Size (DCM SCV is lower)

During the quarter, the macro environment favored stocks with high beta, volatility, and momentum, which created a headwind for the portfolio. As noted in previous commentaries, we have been adding stocks with wider ranges of outcomes as valuations became attractive. This has increased the portfolio's beta and volatility. In addition, Industrials and Information Technology, two sectors with significant portfolio weights, have performed well, reducing the portfolio's underweight to momentum stocks. However, the strength of high beta, volatility, and momentum stocks this quarter outweighed the recent portfolio changes.

Notably, volatility and momentum are no longer among the top five relative factor exposures (historically the portfolio was underweight these factors), indicating improved upside participation potential. For example, small cap value stocks returned approximately +9.1% in May and June combined (taken as the average of the Russell 2000 Value and S&P 600 Value over these two months), and the portfolio captured more than 100% of that upside move. This was due to our repositioning during the April selloff into more cyclical areas. Thus, even as the portfolio underperformed the benchmark for the quarter, it is in a much better position to participate in an up market after the April repositioning while maintaining downside protection with its continued focus on high quality.

Last quarter, we highlighted that small cap value tends to outperform when Nominal GDP is accelerating. We also showed that small cap valuations were already pricing in a mild recession, even as Nominal GDP appeared poised to reaccelerate, creating a favorable setup for small cap value. This quarter, we aim to show how crowded the market has become in large-cap, high-growth, high-momentum stocks. This presents a compelling opportunity for small cap value, both as a source of diversification and for its current unique risk/reward profile. Recent trading days have even seen small cap value rise while large cap growth declined – reminiscent of the 2000-2007 period when small cap value dramatically outperformed large cap growth.

The chart below shows how stretched large cap growth stock valuations have become relative to small cap value. And while arguments can be made about the quality and growth profile of large cap growth stocks being better than small cap value, it is difficult to argue that high expectations aren't already priced in for large cap growth:

Russell 1000 Growth P/S vs Russell 2000 Value P/S:



Source: Bloomberg, Russell

Below is the Bloomberg Pure Momentum Factor Index for the entire US market. This chart shows that extreme crowding in the same high-performing stocks has rarely been this high:

Bloomberg US Pure Momentum Factor Index:

Source: Bloomberg

We can use Morningstar to view this dynamic through a systematic valuation lens that differs from ours at DCM but leads to the same conclusion: small cap value is historically cheap relative to the other style boxes. Below is the overall US equity style box in terms of valuation relative to fair value for each style according to Morningstar analysts and quant models. As can be seen below, small cap value stands out as the only style that is materially undervalued:

Value	Core	Growth	
-0.3%	+6.5%	+14.8%	Large
-7.7%	-0.2%	+15.8%	Mid
-15.4%	-4.5%	+8.4%	Small

Source: Morningstar

Finally, below are three bullet points from a write-up by Bloomberg Intelligence from the middle of June showing, in a different way, just how discounted and extreme the small cap value market has become relative to the broader market:


1. Russell 2000 Relative Multiple Plumbs 17-Year Low

The Russell 2000's 2025 bear market and lack of recovery vs. the S&P 500 has relative multiples hitting a new 17-year low. The index's forward price-to-sales ratio sits at 1.24x, down from the 1.44x peak at the end of 2024. Though it remains above the October 2023 1.01x low, it's good for a 62% discount to the S&P 500. That's below the 55.6% relative discount the small-cap gauge carried in August 2020, and 2.1 standard deviations beneath the average since 2008.

These low valuations need a catalyst to drive performance, and the index is still searching for that spark. Russell 2000 revenue is set to churn into 2026, and the monetary policy path has become increasingly uncertain amid the possibility of tariff-spurred resurgent inflation. (06/12/25)

3. More Than 70% of Small Cap Stocks Are Discounted

Thanks to 2025's bear market and anemic recovery, 70.3% of Russell 2000 stocks are discounted to their recent five-year average on an EV/forward sales basis. Of the 11 GICS sectors, communications (89.6%) has the largest breadth of discounts in the small-cap gauge, followed by real estate (84.8%), health care (84.1), staples (78.1%), energy (77%) and utilities (73.1%). Conversely, industrials (53.5%) has the fewest companies trading at a discount to the recent average, followed by financials (57.6%), tech (64.4%), discretionary (66.2%) and materials (66.7%).

The trade dispute is weighing on multiples as consensus pares estimates amid policy uncertainties. Likewise, higher-for-longer rates have helped keep multiples in check during the post-pandemic period. (06/12/25)



5. Small-Cap Value Hits Extreme Discount to Growth

Investors have handicapped US economic growth in 2025, pushing Russell 2000 value stocks back to an extreme discount vs. the growth style. The style will look to either a swift resolution to the trade dispute or to the Fed cutting rates as a catalyst to rerate higher. Value trades at 1.26x book, or a 70.3% discount to growth, 1.3 standard deviations below the average since 2009. On a price-to-forward sales basis, value's 49.2% discount is likewise 1 standard deviation below its 39.3% average discount since 2009.

The 10-year less three-month Treasury yield curve has been a solid driver of value outperformance. That curve has narrowly uninverted after an easing of trade tensions. Consensus expects it to steepen to 53 bps by 2Q26. (06/12/25)



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Sector Drivers

GICS Sectors	Average Weight			Stock Level Returns		Portfolio Impact	
	Port	Bench	Active	Port	Bench	Contribution	Attribution
Utilities	1.6%	5.9%	-4.4%	-0.5%	-1.3%	-22 bps	84 bps
Industrials	24.1%	12.5%	11.6%	9.3%	9.1%	221 bps	45 bps
Real Estate	3.7%	11.1%	-7.4%	-2.9%	-2.0%	-24 bps	42 bps
Information Technology	14.1%	6.4%	7.7%	14.9%	26.1%	258 bps	42 bps
Health Care	3.1%	8.2%	-5.1%	-4.1%	0.8%	-20 bps	5 bps
Financials	19.9%	30.7%	-10.8%	2.7%	4.3%	55 bps	-26 bps
Consumer Staples	3.6%	2.6%	1.0%	-13.4%	-5.3%	-45 bps	-30 bps
Communication Services	1.1%	3.1%	-2.0%	-7.3%	10.5%	-8 bps	-32 bps
Consumer Discretionary	14.3%	9.1%	5.2%	0.6%	7.9%	64 bps	-64 bps
Materials	6.2%	4.1%	2.1%	-9.1%	11.9%	-53 bps	-120 bps
Energy	7.9%	6.4%	1.5%	-17.4%	-2.2%	-114 bps	-124 bps

(see disclosures)

Utilities and Industrials were the top performing sectors relative to the benchmark. The outperformance in Utilities was due to the portfolio being underweight the underperforming sector. We took advantage of the outperformance in Utilities during the downturn in April to exit all the portfolio's Utility stocks and put that capital into more cyclical areas of the market. The outperformance in Industrials resulted from the portfolio being overweight the outperforming sector.

Energy and Materials were the worst performing sectors relative to the benchmark. The underperformance in Energy was due to below-benchmark stock selection mostly stemming from Helmrich & Payne's (HP) disappointing earnings guidance. The underperformance in Materials resulted from below-benchmark stock selection, as the portfolio's holdings grappled with potential tariffs.

Top 10 Contributors/Detractors

	Top 10 Contributors	Average % Weight	Contribution
1	ADVANCED ENERGY INDUSTRIES	2.92	1.10
2	BEL FUSE INC CL B	2.29	0.76
3	ALAMO GROUP INC	2.87	0.60
4	PAPA JOHN'S INTERNATIONAL INC	2.17	0.54
5	ESCO TECHNOLOGIES INC	2.52	0.50
6	LITTELFUSE INC	1.27	0.47
7	DOUGLAS DYNAMICS INC	1.48	0.37
8	STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS	1.54	0.35
9	JOHNSON OUTDOORS INC A	1.50	0.34
10	VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC	2.34	0.34

	Top 10 Detractors	Average % Weight	Contribution
1	HELMERICH & PAYNE	2.18	(1.13)
2	CARTER'S INC	2.37	(0.59)
3	HUNTSMAN CORP	1.09	(0.34)
4	COLUMBIA SPORTSWEAR CO	1.64	(0.32)
5	THE HACKETT GROUP INC	1.67	(0.26)
6	INNOVEX INTERNATIONAL INC	2.22	(0.24)
7	SPECTRUM BRANDS HOLDINGS INC	0.60	(0.19)
8	CONMED CORP	1.38	(0.18)
9	WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES	0.87	(0.17)
10	MINERALS TECHNOLOGIES INC	1.42	(0.16)

Selected Contributor(s) to Performance

The top contributing stocks to portfolio performance were Advanced Energy Industries (AEIS) and Bel Fuse Inc (BELFB). AEIS, a manufacturer of power conversion products that transform power into usable forms, reported better-than-expected earnings and raised guidance driven by the semiconductor industry and data center demand. BELFB, a manufacturer of electronic components that protect and connect electronic circuits, reported better-than-expected earnings resulting from the end of its customers' inventory de-stocking as well as an acquisition that added value.

Selected Detractor(s) from Performance

The stocks that detracted the most from portfolio performance were Helmrich & Payne (HP) and Carter's Inc (CRI). HP, one of the largest contract land drillers, missed earnings expectations due to lower-than-expected earnings from its recent KCA acquisition. CRI, a children's apparel company, continues to report worse-than-expected earnings as its gross margin is under pressure from lower selling prices and increased marketing expenses. CRI's core customers have struggled with cumulative inflation over the past few years, leading to weak sales at CRI.

Current Positioning

The portfolio's largest overweight sectors relative to the benchmark are Industrials and Information Technology. The largest underweight sectors are Financials and Real Estate. Throughout the quarter, the Consumer Discretionary and Information Technology sectors increased the most in weight as we added weight to cyclical sectors. Conversely, the Utilities and Consumer Staples sectors decreased the most in weight where we funded the cyclical purchases from defensive sectors. As always, these relative weights are a residual of our bottom-up opportunities and not based on a top-down macro call on the market or economy.

We remain focused on the fundamentals of the companies we own and the price we are paying for them. We are confident that a steadfast application of our proven and disciplined process should produce favorable results over time.

Disclosures

Dean Capital Management, LLC (DCM) is an independent investment management firm owned by LLC members and entities affiliated with C.H. Dean, LLC. The firm manages a variety of equity and fixed income assets for institutional and individual investors. DCM claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

The information provided in this report should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any particular security. There is no assurance that any securities discussed herein will remain in an account at the time you receive this report or that securities sold have not been repurchased.

The Small Cap Value style uses value oriented equities, the majority of which have a market capitalization of less than $4 billion at purchase. The strategy is typically invested 90%-100% in equity positions, and the number of holdings typically ranges between 60 and 80. The remainder of the portfolios is typically invested in short term U.S. Treasury Bills or other cash equivalents.

Future performance based on prior results should not be assumed. The Russell 2000 Index measures performance of the small-cap segment of the market and includes approximately 2000 securities based on a combination of their market cap and current index membership. The Russell 2000 represents approximately 7% of the Russell 3000 total market capitalization. The Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 Indexes are subsets of the Russell 3000 Index.

The Russell 2000 Value Index measures the performance of those Russell 2000 companies with lower price-to-book ratios and lower forecasted growth values. The stocks in the Russell 3000 Value Index are also members of either the Russell 1000 Value or the Russell 2000 Value indexes. These stock indexes assume reinvestment of dividends and capital gains, and assume no management, custody, transaction, or other expenses. Russell statistics used in this presentation were obtained from Russell Investments (www.russell.com).

Performance represents all fully discretionary commission accounts for the respective strategy. A complete list and description of DCM's composites and additional information regarding the calculation and reporting of returns is available upon request. To obtain a GIPS report and/or the firm's list of composite descriptions please contact us at 1.913.944.4452.

The securities discussed do not represent an account's entire portfolio and in the aggregate may represent only a small percentage of an account's portfolio holdings. It should not be assumed that any of the securities' transactions or holdings discussed were or will prove to be profitable, or that the investment recommendations or decisions we make in the future will be profitable or will equal the investment performance of the securities discussed herein. The contributors/detractors listed do not represent all securities purchased or sold for our clients. To obtain a list showing the contribution of each holding that contributed to overall performance during the period and the calculation methodology, please call 1.913.944.4452. The detailed sector attribution table is specific to the policy portfolio for the strategy. Individual account results may vary.

Gross performance figures do not reflect payment of investment advisory fees, but do reflect deduction of brokerage commissions and trading expenses. Net of fee performance reflects the deduction of advisory fees, brokerage commissions, trading and other expenses. Net results reflect the deduction of a model fee equivalent to the highest applicable advisory fee 0.80%. The net compounded effect of the deduction of fees over time will be affected by the amount of the fee, the time period, and investment performance. Management fee schedules are available on Form ADV Part 2A.

Performance presents results with all dividend and interest income reinvested and is stated in U.S. Dollar terms. Leverage is not used in any portfolio in these composites.

A performance examination has been performed on performance results from 7/1/08 through 12/31/24. A firm-wide verification was performed for the periods 7/1/08 through 12/31/24. Data subsequent to 5/31/25 represents preliminary performance results.

FOR MORE INFORMATION

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ABOUT DEAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC

Dean Capital Management, LLC ("DCM") is an employee-owned registered investment advisor founded in March 2008. Located in Overland Park, Kansas, DCM is a long-only, fundamental U.S. Value equity manager. DCM manages portfolios across the capitalization spectrum for institutional clients, financial intermediaries and advisors.

DCM is majority-owned by the founding principals, who also comprise the investment team. Additionally, all investment professionals maintain significant personal investments in DCM managed products, further aligning the investment team with our clients.